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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-v-
LAUREN SCOTT CHANCELLOR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20550 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
On the 16th day of March a t 11:30 a t n igh t (R.37) f 
p o l i c e o f f i c e r Hildebrand observed t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s v e h i c l e 
approach the r a i l r o a d c r o s s i n g a t 300 North Barlow. (T-10) . As 
the v e h i c l e approached t h e c r o s s i n g , the f l a s h i n g red l i g h t s were 
a c t i v e and the o f f i c e r ' s v e h i c l e was parked d i r e c t l y a c r o s s the 
t r a c k s , i n t h e p l a i n view of the on-coming v e h i c l e . (T-10) . 
I t was a t t h i s po in t o f f i c e r Hildebrand was s u r p r i s e d 
by t h e a p p e l l a n t as t h e l a t t e r proceeded a c r o s s t h e t r a c k s , 
through the f l a s h i n g red l i g h t s and p o s s i b l y wi thout s t opp ing . 
(T-10) . Under these c i r cums tances , the o f f i c e r f e l t t h a t t he 
a p p e l l a n t ' s behavior was s u s p i c i o u s and decided t o i n v e s t i g a t e 
f u r t h e r . 
The o f f i c e r immediately f l i pped h i s overhead f l a s h i n g 
l i g h t s on whi le t he a p p e l l a n t ' s v e h i c l e was s t i l l i n f ron t of the 
p o l i c e car and they would obvious ly be seen by the d r i v e r . (T-10 
L . 2 5 ) . But t he a p p e l l a n t s t i l l drove pas t t h e marked c a r , l i g h t s 
f l a s h i n g and a l l . In response , t he o f f i c e r made an immediate U-
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turn and pursued the appellant from approximately one and one-
half car lengths behind. (T-ll L.24). The officerfs pursuit of 
the defendant went on for "ten to twelve minutesfn at a slow 
speed despite the "numerous places" to pull over. (T-12 L.24). 
The appellant refused to pull the car over in compliance with the 
officer's signal until he reached his home and drove into the 
driveway, the officer still following with lights remaining on. 
After pulling into the driveway, the appellant entered 
his home and refused to exit despite the officer's request. He 
finally succumbed to the officer's importuning and exited the 
house. (T-13.) The officer asked for the appellant's drivers 
license to which the appellant replied that he did not have one, 
saying that "they took it away" from him. (T-14). A drivers 
license check was made by radio, and the answer came that 
appellant's license had been revoked. (T-14). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant cannot raise for the first time on appeal new 
issues such as the issue of whether the arresting officer had 
probable cause to make the initial stop, especially since the 
trial court was not given the opportunity to hear the issue. In 
any event the circumstances, timef possible failure to stop, 
marked police car, and officer's experience could have all 
combined to at least raise a suspicion and a duty to investigate. 
No error or injustice was committed by the trial court 
when it denied appellants motion to dismiss the charge of 
"Failure to yield to police vehicle" U.C.A. § 41-6-14, where it 
was amended to conform to the facts and adequate notice was given 
to the appellant to prepare a defense. 
-2-
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There was no discrepancy in the Courts reasoning in 
finding that U.C.A. § 41-2-28 is a class A misdemeanor where it 
is so defined by U.C.A. § 41-2-30 to the exclusion of the 
statutes cited by the appellant. 
Appellant incorrectly claims that he is a victim of 
class legislation. Legislation such as U.C.A. § 41-2-28 is a 
valid exercise of states police power and it is rationally 
related to the states inherent interest in public safety on the 
highway and therefore not a denial of equal protection. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A DEFENDANT CANNOT RAISE NEW AND EXTRANEOUS 
ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
Appellate courts generally apply the rule that "they 
will normally only consider questions which were raised and 
reserved in the lower courts...n5 Ara.Jur.2d 29. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also followed this reasoning 
in holding "where no exceptions were taken as to instructions 
given jury nor were they assigned as error for new trial, such 
instructions, whether right or wrong became case law and were 
binding upon jury, court and counsel." Pettingill v. Perkins, 
Utah, 272 P.2d. 185 (1954). This defendant now attempts to raise 
the new issue of whether the arresting officer had probable cause 
to make the initial stop. Since he did not raise this issue in 
the court below, he has waived his right to do so now. To allow 
new and extraneous issues at this appellate level would 
"needlessly prolong litigation, so there will never be an end 
there to." Id. at 186. 
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I t was the defendant 's duty to ra i se a l l relevant 
i s sues in the court below. Fai lure to f u l f i l l t h i s duty has 
denied the t r i a l court the opportunity to correct any error in 
i t s judgment. 
Even where the new issue might be supported by 
evidence, the f a i l u r e to have ra ised the issue below, should 
automatical ly waive defendant 's r igh t now. In Desha Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Qui l l ing , 176 S.W. 132 (1915), a similar attempt to r a i se 
a new issue was made. In t h i s case, Desha Bank was attempting to 
a t tach a l l a s se t s owned by the appellee in an effor t to sa t i s fy 
an outstanding debt owed to the former. During the passage of 
time from the t r i a l to the appeal, one of the appe l l ee ' s had 
passed away. The bank then attempted to hold the decedent's 
insurance policy as collateral. The issue as to whether the bank 
had the right to do so was raised on appeal. The court held: 
"No such issue was raised by the pleadings, and 
the question was not passed upon by the Chancellor; 
and while some testimony on the question appears in the 
record, the point was not fully developed, and for 
these reasons we decline now to pass upon that 
question..." Id. at 186. 
Even if allowed to raise a new issue in the present 
caser appellant's argument mistates the law, officer Hildebrand 
had a reasonable suspicion based on the time, circumstances and 
his experience to make the initial stop that developed the 
probable cause for the amended charge. 
It is well accepted and old precedent that a police 
officer can make an investigative stop on less than probable 
cause. For example, in Adams v. Williams. 402 U.S. 143, 32 L.Ed 
612, 92 S.Ct. 613 (1921), an officer was simply informed that 
-4-
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someone parked in a nearby car "was carrying narcotics and had a 
gun at his waist." Id. 616. The officer approached the parked 
vehicle to further investigate the information and asked the 
defendant to open the doorf but the latter only opened the 
window. 
The officer eventually arrested the defendant on 
several grounds but the issue was raised as to whether probable 
cause was requisite to the investigation. The leading case 
supporting the less than probable cause propositions Terry v. 
Qhisi, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme Court clearly held that; "A 
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of 
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no 
probable cause to make an arrest.11 Id. p.22. A police officer 
merely suspected that two men (who were later joined by another), 
were "casing a jobf a stick up" when he approached themf 
identified himself as a policeman and asked their names. The 
conduct of the suspects confirmed the officers suspicions/ which 
lead to their eventual arrest. At a hearing in a motion to 
suppress the evidencer the officer testified that: "Now, in this 
case when I looked over they didn't look right to me at the 
time." Terry v. Ohio, p.3. The initial stop was upheld even 
though less than probable cause prompted the initial 
investigation. The United States Supreme Court held that where 
"The officer... was performing a legitimate function of 
investigating suspicious conduct... he can make a reasonable 
search for weapons of the person believed to him to be armed and 
-5-
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dangerous." Id. p.22. The court proposed two factors that 
should be considered as requisite to a stop based on less than 
probable cause. Whether the officer under, (1) the circumstances 
and (2) his prior experience had reasonable grounds for making 
the search or seizure. 
In the case of State v. Eastmond, (Utah) 499 P.2d 276 
(1972), a police officer observed the lights of an automobile 
flash on at about 3:00 a.m. in the morning and pull away from a 
medical clinic. With just this short observation the officer 
decided to investigate further; he followed and stopped the car. 
The officer asked the occupants several questions and feeling 
they had an adequate explanation for their late presence released 
them. Howeverf immediately thereafter he investigated further 
and returned to the medical clinic finding a broken window as 
well as an unlocked door. The officer radioed a request to have 
the car stopped again. Upon arriving at the location where the 
car was stopped by another patrol car, the officer placed the 
driver under arrest and began a search of the vehicle. The 
defendants later claimed that the evidence obtained were taken by 
an illegal search and seizure. The court in this case held that: 
"a police officer is not required to 
meet any such standard of perfection 
as to demand an absolutely certain 
judgment before he may act: ratherr 
the test to be applied is one which 
is reasonable and practical under 
the circumstances: whether a 
reasonable and prudent man in his 
position would be justified in 
believing facts which would warrant 
making the arrest. U.C.A. 1953r 
77-13-3." (emphasis added) 
-6-
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The case at bar is very similar in nature. The trained 
officer was surprised by the appellants unusual conduct. Upon 
flipping the patrol cars overhead lights on, in order to stop and 
investigate them, the appellants conduct of not stopping gave the 
officer further suspicion and probable cause to make an arrest. 
In short, the officer initially only had a suspicion of unusual 
conduct upon which he attempted to make an investigative stops. 
Such a stop does not require probable cause and the officer is 
not expected to be "absolutely certain of his judgement before he 
can act." Id. at 276. 
The record reveals that the defendant failed to raise 
the issues as to whether or not there was conduct to give rise to 
a suspicion, much less whether probable cause to arrest on each 
offense existed. This Court has said "though there may be no 
probable cause to make an arrest, a police officer may, in 
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach 
a person for investigating possible criminal behavior." State v. 
Whittenbackr 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980). The Court has also 
stated: 
"When a peace officer sees or hears conduct 
which gives r i s e to suspicion of crime, 
he has not only the r igh t but the duty 
to make observations and inves t iga t ions 
to determine whether the law is being 
v io l a t ed ; and if so, to take such 
measures as are necessary in the 
enforcement of the law." 
State v, Follces. 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977). 
Since each case must therefore be considered on i t s own 
f ac t s , the o f f i c e r ' s experience and t r a in ing can be taken in to 
account by the trial court as well as the different and unusual 
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i 
actions of the defendant* Surely this defendant's actions are no 
less suspicious than those in State v. Whittinbackr where the 
officer simply observed the defendants alone in a laundromat late 
at night. 
In the present case, Officer Hildebrand was "surprised" 
at the appellants conduct during the incident in question. The 
officers reaction was prompted by behavior which he thought was 
unusual under the circumstances and he therefore logically 
investigated his suspicions further, which were confirmed when he 
flipped his overhead signals on and appellant refused to stop 
driving ahead for at least 12 minutes. 
Even if the officer did not have probable cause for an 
arrest, the appellant's conduct of ignoring a marked patrol car 
with flashing red lights, by a dangerous railroad crossing at 
night would certainly constitute "suspicious conduct" under the 
circumstances. 
Even if the issue of probable cause were properly 
raised, the Court obviously and properly found that the 
experienced officer had sufficient reason to believe that the 
facts heavily weighed towards the probability that a crime was 
being committed, under the circumstances. Therefore under the 
non-technical, "totality of the circumstances," the test is the 
factual and practical considerations of every day life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act", may be 
utilized. Here the probability that the appellants behavior was 
of a suspicious nature was confirmed by his willful disobedience 
to the legal command of the investigating police officer. The 
-8-
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confirmation of such a suspicion by the appellants conduct 
inadvertently established probable cause. (Illinois v. Gates. 
103 Sup. Ct. 2317, 2328, (1983), establishing probable cause for 
a warrant by an anonymous letter.) 
In conclusion/ since it is logical and accepted 
precedent for appellate courts to decline to hear any issue or 
pleading that was not raised in the trial court below, the appeal 
should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY REQUIRING 
AN AMENDMENT TO THE CITATION SO THAT THE 
INFORMATION CORRECTLY INFORMED THE 
DEFENDANT OF THE VIOLATION ACTUALLY 
COMMITTED. 
The appellant contends that the amendment required by 
the court was made without his knowledge and resulted in a 
greater penalty than he would have otherwise received. Both of 
these allegations do not conform to the fact or the record. 
First, the appellant received notification of the 
amended citation via certified mail on April 30, 1984. 
Furthermore, the court because of the amendment ordered a 
continuance of the trial date from April 27, 1984 to May 22, 1984 
specifically so that appellant could adequately prepare his 
defense in light of the amendment. He was there I The appellant 
had requested that the second citation be dismissed where it did 
not apply to him, and that an amendment to the citation was 
consequently unjust. 
The original citation did not conform to the facts and 
was for a violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-14, which reads as follows: 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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41-6-14. Applicability and exemptions. (1) The 
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when 
responding to an emergency call or when in the 
pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of 
the law or when responding to but not upon 
returning from a fire alarm, may exercise 
the privileges set forth in this section, but 
subject to the conditions herein stated... 
Clearly the wrong code citation was used. The Court 
saw that the error was corrected and the original citation was 
amended in an effort to accurately reflect the violation 
committed as well as inform the appellant so he could defend. 
The information was amended to clearly show the proper 
violation under U.C.A. £ 41-6-13, which says: 
41-6-13. Obedience to police officer. No 
person shall willfully fail or refuse to 
comply with any lawful order or direction 
of any police officer invested by law 
with authority to direct, control, or 
regulate traffic, 
in the First Security Bank of Utah v. Colonial Ford, 
(Utah) 597 P.2d 859, 860 (1979) a suit was brought for the amount 
remaining due on a promissory note. This Court presented a two 
prong test for determining whether an amendment should be 
allowed. 
"If evidence is objected 
to at the trial on the ground that it 
is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the 
presentation of the merits of action 
will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy 
the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him 
in maintaining his action or defense 
upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary 
to enable the objecting party to 
meet such evidence. Id. p. 861. 
-10-
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Appellant had an opportunit resent * • merits of 
his case i v - uut; « • ' 
"Whatever e l s e may be s a i d a b o u t whe the r 
i t i s manda to ry or d i s c r e t i o n a r y under 
a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s t o g r a n t a m o t i o n 
t o amend, made a f t e r p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
a l l of t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e u n d e r l y i n g p u r p o s e 
of such r u l e s i s t h a t judgment s h o u l d 
be g r a n t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e law 
and e v i d e n c e as t h e ends of j u s t i c e 
r e q u i r e , and t h a t such i s t r u e 
whe the r p l e a d i n g s a r e a c t u a l l y 
amended or n o t ; i n p u r s u i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e 
of j u s t i c e , p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n of 
t h e r u l e s i s t h a t amendments shou ld 
be a l l o w e d i f n e c e s s a r y t o 
a c c o m p l i s h such o b j e c t i v e , where 
a c a s e has a c t u a l l y been t r i e d on 
a d i f f e r e n t i s s u e or a d i f f e r e n t 
t h e o r y t h a n ha s been p l e a d e d . 
R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , r u l e s 
1 5 ( b ) , r4 u I d . p . 8 6 1 . 
d e c i d i n g tiia*. t . t amendmen c * t ^ ; : a t : c ir.ade 
r* :v , r^ uphe lc ' • . * p r e s e n t a t -- «: 
. : . .1 
i i:i commensura te w i t h t h e v i o l a t i o n commit ted c-.d t h e a c t u a l 
f a c t s . Second ly , t h e a p p e l J a n t has f a i l e d t o iihow ain\ im nudirp 
wl: .i c I: w 11111 i < nil !
 i « 11 11 u 1 < 1111 o , e s p e c i a l J y in J i gli t ol 11 it 
c o n t i n u a t i o n it t in o r i g i n a l t r i a l d a t e . He c< u ld not change t h e 
fact . c ;: t h c v n c m r r e d hnt cmil ) ilcfVnd * i n n 1 * * h^rn < n!
 4 »h 
I li - dni( nt u I 11 i In v i hai ges . 
In c.oncl ut; i on r where t h e amendment r* qui reci by 1lit 
t, r i a I i c u i r 1 P I im 1111 i mi mi I i in i mi 111 i i (' I r 11 i 111 i m j i I i t i d j 11 t 111 
j u s t i c e ^;. r e j u d i c e has r e s u l t e d t o t h e a p p e l l a n t , 
* * : * concomi tan t c e n t : r,» brief o l t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l d a t e , * r? 
11» 
lower cour . 
,
 r : - t r i a l 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR. 
Appellant contends that the court erred when it 
designated U.C.A. § 41-2-28 (the first charge against appellant) 
as a Class A misdemeanor. Appellant says that U.C.A. § 76-3-
104(2), which reads: 
"An offense designated a misdemeanor, either 
this code or in another lawf without 
specification as to punishment or category, 
is a class B. misdemeanor." (emphasis added) 
applies to U.C.A. § 41-2-28 (as amended). That section of the 
Code and Section 29 are specific and in point. The motor vehicle 
sections specifies: 
41-2-28. Unlawful to drive while license 
suspended or revoked. Any person whose 
operator's or chauffeur1s license has been 
suspended or revoked, as provided in this 
act, and who shall drive any motor vehicle 
upon the highways of this state while such 
license is suspended or revoked, phall be 
be guilty of a misdemeanor# and upon 
conviction shall be punished as provided 
in section 41-2-30. 
41-2-29. Violation of act-Penalty, (a) It 
shall be a misdemeanor for any person to 
violate any of the provisions of this act 
unless such violation is by this act or 
other law of this state declared to be a 
felony. 
(b) Unless another penalty is in this act 
or by the laws of this state provided, 
every person convicted of a misdemeanor 
for the violation of any provisions of 
this act shall be punished by a fine of 
not more than $299 or by imprisonment 
of not more than six months, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment. 
41-2-30. Penalty for driving while 
license suspended or revoked. Any 
person convicted of a violation of 
-12-
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s e c t i o n 4 1 _ 2 - 2 8 S h a l l be p u n i s h e d 
by imprisonment i n the county or 
municipal j a i l for a per iod of not 
more than s i x months and t h e r e may 
be imposed in a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o a 
f i ne of not more than, $299. (emphasis added) 
111, becomes c l e a r t h a t the t r i a l cour t and D i s t r i ct 
UHii i inertly toJJowecJ ino s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n oi me riil e i i 1 
q u e s t i o n . 
r.* 
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Procedure allow the T r i a l Court reasonable d i s c r e t i o n upon 
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same kind of discretion in a criminal cast - * :«_ Utah Code of 
Criminal ProcedL I r » 11. i" ,l " " / * - • 
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nIf at any time before verdict or judgment ( 
a mistake has been made in charging the 
proper offense, and it appears that there 
is probable cause to believe that the 
defendant is chargeable with another offense, 
the Court may commit or require bail to 
answer t he proper charge when f i l e d , . . . i 
(emphasis added) 
The general provisions of the Criminal Code, U.C.A. § 76-1-106, 
also provides that a penal statute is not to be strictly 
construed and "shall be construed according to fair import of 
their terms to promote justice." 
The Utah Code sections subsequent to U.C.A. § 41-2-28 
clearly define the punishment applicable to the specified 
violation of such. Consequently an enhancement of the penalty 
has not occurred. 
In short, where the lower Courts merely followed the 
prescribed statutory guidelines for the penalty connected to the 
violation and facts their logic and common sense should be upheld 
by this Court. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT WAS GRANTED EQUAL PROTECTION. 
This Court has long held that statutes involving public 
safety, and the protection of health, peace, morals, and general 
welfare of people are uniformly held to be constitutional. For 
example, this Court has stated in State v. Christensen, Utah, 639 
P.2d 205, (1981), Per Curiam filed December 29, 1981 No. 17791: 
Neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution nor any provision of the Constitu-
tion of this state was designed to interfere 
with the police power to enact and enforce 
laws for the protection of health, peace, 
safety, morals, or general welfare of the people. 
-14-
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There was no showing in the court below or in the 
District Court below that this defendant was treated any 
differently than any other person charged with failing to obey 
the command of a peace officer or driving on a revoked license 
and therefore the rulings of the lower court should be upheld as 
being without merit, 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant should be precluded from attempting to 
raise a new and extraneous issue where he had an opportunity to 
raise in the trial court and failed to do. 
The trial court correctly made an amendment to the 
original citation. For the court to have done otherwise, would 
be tantamount to expecting perfection in administrative 
functions. The amendment was made in order to do justice to the 
facts of the case and the trial courts unabused discretion should 
be upheld. 
Finallyr the trial courts reasoning was logical in 
designating U.C.A. § 41-2-28 as a Class A misdemeanor in that its 
decision was set by the statutory mandate of U.C.A. § 41-2-30. 
Its discretion and logical rulings should therefore be upheld by 
this Court as did the District Court since they are consistent 
with the facts as applied to the law, thus not prejudicing the 
defendant or denying justice to the people. 
) AV. 
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BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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